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Joint Ventures in the Soviet Union:
Problems Emerge*
I. INTRODUCTION
On January 13, 1987, the Presidium1 of the USSR Supreme
Soviet and the Soviet Union's Council of Ministers2 issued
laws3 that authorized the establishment of joint ventures4 in
* The author would like to thank Bill Frenkel, Esq. of LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby &
MacRae for his generous advice and assistance. The author also acknowledges the
valuable assistance and comments of Professor Michael Newcity of the University of
Puget Sound School of Law and David Kelley of the Russian Research Center,
Harvard University.
1. According to the Soviet Constitution, the Presidium is the highest policy
making body of the Soviet Union. KONST. SSSR (Constitution) art. 118-20 (USSR).
2. "The Council of Ministers of the USSR, i.e., the Government of the USSR, is
the highest executive and administrative body of state authority of the USSR."
KONST. SSSR (Constitution) art. 128 (USSR).
3. The initial laws consisted of an Edict and a Decree. The Presidium of the
USSR on January 13, 1987, passed the Edict On Questions Concerning the
Establishment in the Territory of the USSR and Operations of Joint Ventures,
International Amalgamations and Organizations with the Participation of Soviet and
Foreign Organizations, Firms and Management Bodies [hereinafter Edict] (the official
Russian text appears in Vedomosti Verkhovnovo Sovieta SSSR (1987), no. 2, item 35).
The USSR Council of Ministers on January 13, 1987, enacted the Decree On the
Establishment of the Territory of the USSR and Operation of Joint Ventures with the
Participation of Soviet Corporations and Firms from Capitalist and Developing
Countries [hereinafter Decree] (the official Russian text appears in the official gazette,
Sobranie Postanovlenii i Pravitelstva SSSR (1987), no. 9, item 40). The Edict
authorized the formation of joint ventures, while the Decree provided the basic
guidelines for their operation and establishment. Both laws were retroactive to
January 1, 1987.
Many English translations of the laws are available. E.g., Pravda, Jan. 27, 1987, at
2, col. 1 (Eng. ed.); E. THEROUX & A. GEORGE, JOINT VENTURES IN THE SOVIET UNION:
LAW AND PRACTICE (1988) [hereinafter LAW AND PRACTICE] (published by Baker &
McKenzie, Washington, D.C.) Kelley, The Soviet Joint Venture Decree: Law and
Structure (available at Russian Research Center, Harvard University); The Soviet
Socialist Republics: Decree of Joint Enterprises with Western and Developing
Countries, 26 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 749 (1987) [hereinafter Joint Venture Decree];
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Edict Concerning Taxation of Joint Enterprises
in the Soviet Union and Dispute Settlement, 26 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 759 (1987)
[hereinafter Joint Enterprises].
4. The principle characteristics of a joint venture are the pooling of assets to
166 University of Puget Sound Law Review [Vol. 13:165
the Soviet Union for the first time in nearly 60 years.5 The
Soviets outlawed joint ventures in 1930 because "foreign con-
trol over any sector of the Soviet Union was ideologically unac-
ceptable."6 However, the promulgation of the new Soviet laws,
confirmed in the West in October 1986,7 was another important
move in General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's bold per-
estroika8  (restructuring). The main question for potential
American investors 9 is whether they can profit under the new
joint venture laws, in an atmosphere of perestroika, knowing
that such efforts failed in the past.10
The primary purpose of this Comment is to examine the
problems facing Americans who want to set up joint ventures
in the Soviet Union. Before examining the challenges, the
create a new economic entity, sharing of profits and losses, and managing the new
entity jointly. Pederson, Joint Ventures in the Soviet Union: A Legal and Economic
Perspective, 16 HARV. INT'L L.J. 390, 390 (1975).
5. Dean, Updating Soviet Joint Venture Law and Practice, 23 COLUM. J. WORLD
Bus. 53 (1988). For an excellent comparison of the current joint venture laws and the
1923 laws, see Comment, Joint Venture Law in the Soviet Union: The 1920's and the
1980's, 9 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 633 (1989).
6. Ross, Foreign Investment: New Soviet Joint Venture Law, 28 HARV. INT'L L.J.
473, 473 (1987).
7. Yuri Scherbima confirmed on October 23, 1986, in Washington, D.C., the Soviet
decision to permit joint ventures in the Soviet Union. Dunn, The New Soviet Joint
Venture Regulations, 12 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 171 (1987).
8. Perestroika has three parts: economic reform, economic discipline, and
industrial modernization. Though Gorbachev has implemented many plans under
perestroika, all three parts must succeed for perestroika to work. Central Intelligence
Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency, Report to the Subcommittee on National
Security Economics of the Joint Economic Committee, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.,
Gorbachev's Economic Program: Problems Emerge 6 (Comm. Print 1988) [hereinafter
Gorbachev's Program].
Perestroika should not be confused with glasnost (openness). Perestroika deals
with economic restructuring; glasnost deals with increasing democratic freedoms in the
Soviet Union. Marshall Goldman has argued that glasnost is necessary to help
perestroika succeed. Goldman, Perestroika in the Soviet Union, CURRENT HISTORY,
Oct. 1988, at 313 [hereinafter Perestroika in the Soviet Union]; Goldman and Goldman,
Soviet and Chinese Economic Reform, FOREIGN AFF. 1987/1988, at 551, 560 [hereinafter
Soviet and Chinese Economic Reform].
9. This Comment focuses on the American viewpoint and experiences in dealing
with joint ventures in the Soviet Union.
According to Anatoly Belov, chief of the Department of Legal Protection of
Foreign Economic Relations in the Soviet Ministry of Justice, two problems are
holding up many joint ventures. One problem is the insistence that profits be
transferable in hard currency, although made in rubles. A second problem is that the
West wants all disputes between the Soviet partners and the foreign investors to be
arbitrated by a third party. Trade Policy: Soviet Official Says Western Demands
Impede Further Joint Venture Accords, DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA) July
21, 1988, No. 140, at 1 [hereinafter Trade Policy].
10. E.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1987, § 3, at 4, col. 3.
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rationale for the decision to permit joint ventures and the
objectives that the Soviets hope to achieve will be addressed.
This Comment will then discuss the major provisions of the
laws and the major problems these laws have caused for Amer-
ican investors. Finally, the major systemic and political
problems confronting joint ventures will be examined.
II. JOINT VENTURES AND SOVIET GOALS
The Soviet decision to permit joint ventures in the Soviet
Union is a vital part of perestroika. The success of joint ven-
tures and of perestroika will depend somewhat on the success
of the other. Likewise, the failure of one also will affect the
other. Consequently, one must have a basic understanding of
perestroika and of Soviet economic problems11 to fully under-
stand the role of joint ventures and the Soviet decision to per-
mit them.
According to Gorbachev, perestroika is a result of Soviet
dissatisfaction with the Soviet economy's poor growth rates,
which have worsened in the last decade. Perestroika is neces-
sary to help close the gap, especially in high technology prod-
ucts, between the Soviet and Western economies caused by this
poor growth and development. 12 Moreover, Gorbachev argues
that perestroika must be implemented immediately. The delay
or failure of perestroika could cause serious social, economic,
and political problems. 3 Thus, Gorbachev has proposed and
implemented many economic reforms that are intended to aid
the Soviet Union's transformation into an economic
superpower. 4
To become an economic superpower, the Soviet Union
must first become a major player in the world economy. Real-
11. Marshall Goldman, an expert in Soviet economics, has written many books
that examine the problems facing the Soviet economy. E.g., M. GOLDMAN,
GORBACHEV'S CHALLENGE: ECONOMIC REFORM IN THE AGE OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY
(1987) [hereinafter GORBACHEV'S CHALLENGE]; M. GOLDMAN, USSR IN CRISIS: THE
FAILURE OF AN ECONOMIC SYSTEM (1983) [hereinafter USSR IN CRISIS].
12. M. GORBACHEV, PERESTROIKA: NEW THINKING FOR OUR COUNTRY AND THE
WORLD (1987). Gorbachev argues that perestroika is necessary to bridge "the gap in
the efficiency of production, quality of products, scientific and technological
development, the production of advanced technology and the use of advanced
techniques." Id. at 19.
13. Id. at 17.:
14. Sherr, Briefing Paper 1, Socialist-Capitalist Joint Ventures in the USSR-- Law
and Practice 5 (1988) (available at Center for Foreign Policy Development, Brown
University).
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izing this, the Soviets have taken several bold steps to inte-
grate their economy into the world economy. One such move
has been the discussion by leading Soviet economists of a
freely convertible ruble,15 perhaps by the late 1990s. 6 Unfor-
tunately, most Western economists believe a freely convertible
ruble is not possible within this century. 7 Second, the Soviets
applied for membership to the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT)"8 in October 1986, but were rejected.' 9
GATT membership would make Soviet goods eligible for tariff
reductions and give the Soviets important international eco-
nomic experience.2' The third and fourth steps were Soviet
bids to join the World Bank2' and the International Monetary
Fund (IMF).22
Many factors motivated the Soviet decision to permit joint
ventures in the Soviet Union. The main factor was the poor
15. A freely convertible currency or hard currency is one that may be exchanged
for gold or other currencies with no restrictions. Non-convertible or soft currencies,
such as the ruble, are ones whose value is artificial and whose circulation is limited.
N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1987, at A15, col. 1.
16. Sherr, supra note 14, at 13 n. 21.
17. Conference Board, U.S.-Soviet Joint Ventures, 15 PERSP. 6 (1988). A fully
convertible ruble would require major reforms that would take years to implement
and probably would be resisted within the Soviet Union. N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1987, at
A15, col. 1.
18. GATT is the principal multialteral organization that is designed to reduce
barriers to international trade.
19. N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1986, at 40, col. 4. The U.S. led the opposition to the
Soviets' application. Id. The nature of the Soviet economy makes it incompatible with
GATT. McIntyre, Soviet Efforts to Revamp the Foreign Trade Sector, in Joint
Economic Committee, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 Gorbachev's Economic Plans, 489, 502
(1987).
The U.S. government has stated that significant reforms must take place in the
Soviet economy before the Soviet Union can be considered for GATT membership. J.
HARDT AND J. BOONE, U.S.-SOVIET COMMERCIAL RELATIONS IN A PERIOD OF
NEGOTIATION, Congressional Research Service 13, Aug. 1988 (available from the
Library of Congress, Order Cede IB88065) [hereinafter ISSUE BRIEF]. However, the
official U.S. position on joint ventures is neutrality. Zabijaka, USS.R.: Summit
Leaders Support Mutually Beneficial Trade, Bus. AM., Apr. 25, 1988, at 17.
20. McIntyre, supra note 19, at 502. Some have suggested that the Soviets are
more interested in trade reform than in financial reform. Brainard, Soviet
International Financial Policy: Traditional Formulas or New Innovations?, in Joint
Economic Committee, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 Gorbachev's Economic Plans 100, 110
(1987).
21. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World
Bank) helps finance infrastructure development in developing countries.
22. See Jacoby with McCormick, Gorbachev's Prairie Pals, Newsweek, Apr. 6,
1987, at 31. But see ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 19, at 14 (reporting that the Soviets have
not tried to join the IMF or the World Bank). The IMF was established to provide
international exchange rate stability and to coordinate member state financial policies.
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performance of the Soviet economy in recent years.23 This
poor performance has exacerbated the Soviet lag in high tech-
nology products and has forced Gorbachev to develop a long-
term strategy to make the Soviet economy competitive in such
industries.24 A reduction in Soviet hard currency earnings25
and Soviet disdain for borrowing money from the West made it
unlikely that the Soviets would rely on Western high technol-
ogy imports to solve their problems.26 Moreover, high technol-
ogy imports have not helped the Soviet economy become
competitive.
A second factor that influenced the decision to allow joint
ventures in the Soviet Union was the Soviet desire to avoid a
return to the policies of detente. This desire stems from
Gorbachev's belief that detente hurt the Soviet economy.2 A
third factor was that Soviet attempts at turnkey factories29 and
licensing arrangements have not been successful.3 ° Finally, the
Soviets could not rely on their Eastern European allies for eco-
nomic assistance because the Eastern Europeans have their
23. Sherr, supra note 14, at 1. As of October 1988, the Soviets had more than 100
joint ventures with foreign partners and more than 500 additional projects were being
negotiated. There were only 17 U.S. joint ventures operating at the time, while more
than 50 letters of intent had been signed. Trade Policy: More than 300 Soviet Projects
Planned to Include Foreign Input, Official Says, DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES
(BNA) No. 193, at 1 (Oct. 5, 1988).
24. Gorbachev's long-term challenge is to make the Soviet economy competitive in
the high technology revolution. M. GORBACHEV, supra note 12, at 27; Goldman,
Gorbachev and Economic Reform, FOREIGN AFF., Fall 1985, at 56, 58 [hereinafter
Gorbachev and Economic Reform].
25. Low oil prices have greatly reduced Soviet hard currency earnings in recent
years. McIntyre, The USSR's Hard Currency Trade and Payments Position, in Joint
Economic Committee, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 Gorbachev's Economic Plans 474, 475
(1987).
26. See McIntyre, supra note 19, at 496.
27. GORBACHEV'S CHALLENGE, supra note 11, at 120. Goldman argues that the
Soviets inefficiently use the high technology products that they import from the West.
Id.
28. Gorbachev argues that during detente the Soviets discontinued some of their
research and development in high technology, naively relying on expanded economic
and trade relations with the West to meet their needs. M. GORBACHEV, supra note 12,
at 93-94. Moreover, the Soviets believe a vested interest in the Soviet economy by
Western firms would reduce the risk of a sudden change in East-West economic
relations. Sherr, supra note 14, at 7.
29. Turnkey projects are transactions in which "the contractor agrees to handle
every detail of the project including the training of operations personnel. At the
completion of the contract, the customer is handed the key to a completed plant that is
fully ready for operations." S. ROBOCK AND K. SIMMONDS, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 468 (1983).
30. Sherr, supra note 14, at 2.
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own economic and technological problems,3 1 as well as serious
political problems.32 Given these constraints, the Soviets
decided that allowing joint ventures in the Soviet Union would
be an excellent way to help improve their economy. 3
Having decided to allow joint ventures, the Soviets have
been direct about the place joint ventures will have in per-
estroika. Ideally, the Soviets want joint ventures to accomplish
five goals. First, the Soviets want to gain access to Western
high technology.34 As Marshall Goldman has pointed out,
many high technology products have life cycles of only two to
three years.35 Thus, Soviet imports of high technology prod-
ucts have actually worsened the Soviet position vis-a-vis West-
ern economies in high technology industries. The Soviets
believe that joint ventures are likely to have the latest technol-
ogy because American companies, having a vested interest in
the ventures' performance, will update the technology in their
joint ventures.36
Second, the Soviets expect joint ventures to help increase
Soviet exports.37 Gorbachev believes that improving the
export sector of the economy is necessary in order to obtain
long-term economic improvement,3 and that joint ventures are
crucial in this regard.39
The third goal, which is closely related to the second, is
import substitution.4 ° Import substitution is the reduction of
31. Id. at 3; Gorbachev's Program, supra note 8, at 39.
32. Gorbachev's Program, supra note 8, at 39; Gati, Gorbachev and Eastern
Europe, FOREIGN AFF., Summer 1987, at 958 [hereinafter Gorbachev and Eastern
Europe]. Gati argues that some leaders of Eastern Europe have taken a wait-and-see
attitude toward Gorbachev's reforms, while others are outraged at the move toward
capitalism. In either case, these leaders are skeptical about whether Gorbachev will
succeed in his reforms. Gorbachev and Eastern Europe, supra, at 959-69.
33. Consistent with Gorbachev's belief that the Soviet Union was hurt by detente,
he desires economic ties with the West but wants to avoid dependence. Sherr, supra
note 14, at 5.
34. Dean, supra note 5, at 54.
35. Gorbachev and Economic Reform, supra note 24, at 58-59. The reliance on
imports, instead of developing the high technology products at home, denies the
Soviets valuable research and development. GORBACHEV'S CHALLENGE, supra note 11,
at 120. Another drawback of imports is that the Soviets themselves must continually
import the newest products, which will make the technological gap close more slowly.
36. Dean, supra note 5, at 54; Sherr, supra note 14, at 7.
37. Dean, supra note 5, at 54.
38. Gorbachev's Program, supra note 8, at 12.
39. The Soviets believe that Western technology will help improve the quality of
Soviet goods, which will make them competitive on the world market. Zabijaka, supra
note 19, at 7.
40. Dean, supra note 5, at 54; McIntyre, supra note 19, at 500. Stalin also used this
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imports and the production at home of these previously
imported products. In the long run, the Soviets want to reduce
their reliance on imports and increase their exports by substi-
tuting products produced by the joint venture.41
The Soviets' fourth goal is for the joint ventures to earn
hard currency.42 The Soviets need hard currency to buy goods
in the world market because the ruble, the Soviet currency, is
a soft currency and, therefore, is not freely exchangeable. The
Soviets also must diversify their hard currency earnings
because they are too dependent on unreliable sources, namely
oil, gas, and weapons sales.43 For example, earnings from oil
exports, the Soviets' largest source of hard currency, have beengreatly reduced due to the drop in oil prices.44 Similarly, earn-
ings from weapons sales, the Soviets' second largest source of
hard currency, fell during the 1980s"5 and are not expected to
improve in the future.46
Finally, the Soviets hope the joint ventures will provide
improved technical and managerial training.4" The Soviet
Union has a shortage of competent managers and lacks the
facilities to train managers in the newest management strate-
gies. The Soviets believe that Western management expertise
and training will help Soviet businesses become more
competitive.48
In addition to specifying what they want the joint ventures
to achieve, the Soviets have also been specific about the indus-
tries in which they want joint ventures to operate. The Soviets
want joint ventures in chemical manufacturing, "wood process-
ing, electronics, communications, computer-aided design, petro-
leum refining and petrochemical industries, construction
strategy as part of his economic development plan. GORBACHEV'S CHALLENGE, supra
note 11, at 26-27.
41. McIntyre, supra note 25, at 479. The Soviets have cut back on machinery
imports from the West, planning to substitute the products produced by the joint
ventures. Id. at 485.
42. Zabijaka, supra note 19, at 7-8.
43. See C. Wolf, Commentary, in Joint Economic Committee, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess., 2 Gorbachev's Economic Plans 550 (1987).
44. McIntyre, supra note 25, at 477.
45. Id. at 478.
46. Wolf, supra note 43, at 550.
47. Dean, supra note 5, at 54.
48. However, proper training of managers does not ensure that they will succeed
in running businesses more effectively. GORBACHEV'S CHALLENGE, supra note 11, at
129.
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materials, and light and food industries."49 Joint ventures in
these industries would greatly improve the Soviet economic
outlook.
III. THE JOINT VENTURE LAWS
This section will examine some of the major provisions of
the Soviet joint venture laws.5' The initial laws of January
1987, replaced the preliminary guidelines that had been issued
by the Soviet government in 1986, but which had yet to take
effect. 51 Many of the initial Soviet laws were considered vague
and were not well received by many in the United States.52
The Soviets sought to address these concerns by issuing, in
September 1987, supplemental laws that clarified or modified
the initial laws.53
Current Soviet joint venture laws are governed by four
sets of regulations. The first set of regulations is the Supreme
Soviet's Edict of January 1987, which authorizes the establish-
ment of joint ventures.' The second set of regulations is the
Council of Ministers' Decree of January 1987 (Joint Venture
Decree), which contains the basic framework for joint venture
operations.55 Third is the September 17, 1987, Supplemental
Decree of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union and the Council of Ministers.56 Finally, the
December 2, 1988, Council of Ministers' Resolution modifies
49. McIntyre, supra note 19, at 500. However, the Soviets do not want joint
ventures in mining. Zabijaka, supra note 19, at 8.
50. Not every provision will be discussed, nor will the lengthy process of
negotiating and establishing a joint venture be addressed. This process has been
discussed in great depth elsewhere. E.g., LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 9-18;
Sherr, supra note 14, at 14-28.
Several articles examine the provisions of the January 1987 laws. Carpenter and
Smith, US.-Soviet Joint Ventures: A New Opening in the East, 43 Bus. LAW 79 (1987);
Hober, Joint Ventures with the Soviet Union, 6 INT'L FIN. L. REV. 15 (1987); Viehe,
Joint-Ventures in the Soviet Union Under the New Regime-Boom or Bust, 1
TRANSNT'L LAW. 181 (1988); Recent Developments-Foreign Investment: New Soviet
Joint Venture Law, 28 HARV. INT'L L.J. 473; Comment, Glasnost: Joint Ventures Now
Permitted in the Soviet Union, 3 FLA. INT'L L.J. 125 (1987).
51. The guidelines are republished in Dunn, supra note 7, at 182-186.
52. IssuE BRIEF, supra note 19, at 10; Viehe, supra note 50, at 182; Wall Street J.
Apr. 6, 1987, at 25, col. 4.
53. Viehe, supra note 50, at 192.
54. See Edict, supra note 3.
55. See Decree, supra note 3.
56. "On Additional Measures to Streamline Foreign Economic Activity In the
New Conditions of Economic Management" (Supplemental Decree).
[Vol. 13:165
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many of the earlier provisions.5 7 Before examining the appli-cation of the laws, the preliminary stages of negotiations will
be examined.
A. Preliminaries and Documentation
The first document the American and Soviet negotiatorswill produce is a letter of intent. The letter of intent outlines
the basic elements of the venture, but is not legally binding onthe parties."8 The next task is to draft a feasibility study. The
study has two purposes: 1) to persuade the Soviets that theproposed joint venture should be approved, and 2) to form abasis for agreement between the partners. In essence, thestudy contains the business projections and goals of the ven-
ture and should include the background of the project, pro-jected sales and revenues, and the method of accounting to be
used.5 9
The Foundation Documents contain the venture's basic
documentation and consist of the joint venture agreement, itscharter, and any other provisions that the partners want toinclude that are not contrary to Soviet law.6 ° The charter acts
as the articles of incorporation and bylaws and must specify
certain matters prescribed by the Joint Venture Decree such
as the objectives and purposes of the venture. 6 1
B. Management and Personnel
Under the Joint Venture Decree, joint venture manage-
ment is delegated to two bodies. The joint venture's governing
body is its Board of Directors. The parties will designate themembers of the Board of Directors, whose Chairman may be aSoviet citizen.6 2 The Board's specific responsibilities and activi-
57. USSR Council of Ministers Resolution On Further Developing the ForeignEconomic Activity of State, Cooperative, and Other Public Enterprises, Associations,and Organizations [hereinafter Resolution] is printed in EKONOMICHESK4YA
GAZETA, No. 51, Dec. 1988, at 17-18, reprinted in FBIS-SU, Dec. 19, 1988, 61.58. Sherr, supra note 14, at 19.
59. LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 12-13.60. Sherr, supra note 14, at 24. The translation of the Joint Venture Decree usedin this Comment translates the documents as constitutive documents. JointEnterprises, supra note 3, at 751. However, the common term is FoundationDocuments, which will be used here. See generally LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 3,at 13; Sherr, supra note 14, at 24.
61. LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 13; Joint Venture Decree, supra note 3, at
751.
62. Resolution, supra note 57, at 67. Under the original decree, the chairman hadto be a Soviet citizen. Joint Venture Decree, supra note 3, at 753.
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ties shall be stated in the Foundation Documents.
The second body, the Directorate, is the venture's manage-
ment and is in charge of day to day operations of the venture.63
The Directorate's Director General is the venture's operating
manager and also may be a Soviet citizen.64 The rest of man-
agement's personnel will consist of Soviet and foreign citizens.
The American partner has several ways to maintain suffi-
cient influence in management decisions. First, the parties
may agree in the venture's charter that some non-fundamental
questions regarding the venture's activities require unanimity
for approval. Under the new Resolution, "[flundamental ques-
tions of the activity of a joint venture are decided at board
meetings on the basis of the unanimity of all board mem-
bers. ' 65 This provision allows the American partner to protect
its own agenda." According to Alan Sherr, "[e]ven the most
sensitive and important issues-such as how quality control
will be assured, how much of the venture's product will be
exported, or how hiring and firing decisions will be made-
may be included in this list."67
Second, because the Joint Venture Decree does not
require representation on the Board or Directorate to be in
proportion to the partners' shares, the partners may negotiate
representation on these bodies between themselves.68 More-
over, the American party may designate its own representative
to supervise specific areas of venture operations by so provid-
ing in the Foundation Documents. For example, the Soviets
have allowed the foreign partner to appoint its own quality
control representatives.69
The personnel of the venture must consist primarily of
Soviet citizens. Soviet law controls the salary, work schedule,
leisure time, and social insurance of Soviet citizens who work
at the joint venture.70 Though Soviet labor law will govern the
appointment and dismissal of Soviet citizens who work at the
joint venture, these decisions may be made by the joint ven-
63. Joint Venture Decree, supra note 3, at 753.
64. Resolution, supra note 57, at 67. Under the Decree, the Director General was
a Soviet citizen. Joint Enterprises, supra note 3, at 753.
65. Resolution, supra note 57, at 67.
66. Id. at 751.
67. Sherr, supra note 14, at 29. There is even a list of the areas in which
unanimity might be sought. LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 19.
68. Joint Venture Decree, supra note 3, at 753.
69. Dean, supra note 5, at 56.
70. Joint Venture Decree, supra note 3, at 757.
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ture.71 Likewise, Soviet law will govern "various aspects of theterms and conditions of work for foreign citizens employed by
the joint venture. '7 2 However, foreign personnel shall enter
separate contracts regarding their salaries, vacations, and
pension.7 3
Though the Joint Venture Decree outlines the basic rules
governing personnel, the American partner should try to nego-
tiate key personnel issues to its benefit and include them in
the Foundation Documents. For example, Richard Dean con-
tends that American partners should try to negotiate arrange-
ments that preclude the Soviets from unilaterally setting allpersonnel policies. Instead, personnel policies "would be mat-
ters for the mutual agreement of the foreign investor and its
Soviet partner at either the Board or Directorate level. '7 4 Fur-
ther, the American partners must be adamant in negotiations
regarding their intentions to attract and motivate the best
Soviet workers. To meet these goals, the American partner
should stress that it wants the freedom to pay workers more
than the standard Soviet wages, a freedom the Soviets appear
to have allowed.7 5 Finally, the American partner must insist
that only competent Soviet managers with the necessary polit-
ical clout and the ability to work well with Americans 6 will be
selected.
In general, most American partners have not had serious
personnel-related problems. Soviet labor laws, in part, pre-vented ContiTrade Services from satisfactorily negotiating a
joint venture. However, the ContiTrade experience has been
71. Resolution, supra note 57, at 67. See generally Laurita and McGloin, US-Soviet
Joint Ventures: Current Status and Propsects, 23 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 43, 49 (1988).
According to David Kelley, joint ventures may fire Soviet workers for good cause but
this process may be protracted. Telephone interview with David Kelley, Visiting
Scholar, Russian Research Center, Harvard University (Jan. 13, 1989).
72. Viehe, supra note 50, at 199.
73. Joint Venture Decree, supra note 3, at 757-58.
74. Dean, supra note 5, at 56.
75. Id. Under the Resolution, "the forms and size of remuneration, and material
incentives in Soviet rubles with regard to personnel of the joint venture are decided by
the joint venture." Resolution, supra note 57, at 67.
The American partner also might consider paying Soviet workers in hard-to-find
products. Berman and Wechsler, The Five-Percenters, Moscow's Pet Capitalists,
Forbes, Feb. 6, 1989, at 93, 97. However, incentive pay to help motivate workers andbonuses for others who excel are highly sensitive issues. Sherr, supra note 14, at 38;
Laurita and McGloin, supra note 71, at 50.
76. Laurita and McGloin, supra note 71, at 48.
77. Mikkelsen, US.-Soviet Joint Ventures Face Roadblocks Despite New Rules,
REUTER Bus. REP., Nov. 2, 1988, at 1.
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the exception.
C. Dispute Resolution
Dispute resolution mechanisms are vital to the success of
joint ventures in the Soviet Union because they can offer an
American partner assurances that disputes will be resolved
fairly and objectively. Soviet law governs disputes between the
joint venture and the Soviet authorities, between joint ven-
tures, and between the joint venture participants themselves
on issues related to joint venture operations.7 ' The parties may
bring these disputes either to a Soviet court or, by agreement
of the parties, to an arbitration tribunal for resolution in
accordance with Soviet law.79 Additionally, by specifically pro-
viding in the Foundation Documents, the parties may agree to
use the law of another country when interpreting the Founda-
tion Documents."° Although the Soviets have been flexible on
dispute resolution issues," the American partner should
include in the Foundation Documents specific provisions for
dispute resolutions to eliminate problems regarding the dispute
resolution process.
D. Duration and Termination of the Joint Venture
The partners may agree in the Foundation Documents, or
in another agreement, on the venture's duration. The duration
may be indefinite, and the Foundation Documents do not
establish a minimum or maximum time requirement.8 2
The Joint Venture Decree also allows the partners to
establish the circumstances for terminating the joint venture.8 3
One commentator has written that the American partner
should specify in the Foundation Documents the conditions for
78. Joint Venture Decree, supra note 3, at 753. Dispute resolution is explained in
detail in LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 38-39.
79. Joint Venture Decree, supra note 3, at 753. The Soviets have allowed
arbitration in London at the London Court of International Arbitration and in
Stockholm at the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce. LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note
3, at 38-39.
80. LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 38. The Soviets have limited this ability
to a select number of internal, organizational matters. Soviet law will still govern
most substantive questions arising out of the Foundation Documents. Letter from Bill
Frenkel to the author (May 30, 1989) [hereinafter Letter] (on file at the University of
Puget Sound Law Review).
81. LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 38, 39; Dean, supra note 5, at 57.
82. Joint Venture Decree, supra note 3, at 751; see generally LAW AND PRACTICE,
supra note 3, at 40; Sherr, supra note 14, at 27.
83. Joint Venture Decree, supra note 3, at 751.
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termination "in the event that contingencies develop that prej-
udice its interests." 4 Moreover, that commentator believes
that the American partner should try to limit the conditions
under which the Soviets could liquidate the venture.8 5
The Joint Venture Decree contains a second provision for
terminating the venture. This provision, which is perhaps the
most disturbing provision in the Joint Venture Decree, grants
the Council of Ministers power to liquidate the venture. 86 This"ominous provision [states] that the USSR Council of Ministers
may [unilaterally] liquidate a joint venture if its activities are
not consistent with its stated objectives ' 87 as set out in the
charter.88
This provision has generated much concern and many
questions. For example, American businessmen fear that the
Council of Ministers may arbitrarily terminate the venture.
Fortunately, such fear may be unwarranted. First, such action
would thwart Soviet attempts to make the Soviet Union an
attractive place for American investment and would seriously
damage the Soviet Union's rating as an excellent credit risk. 9
And second, the liquidation provision is at odds with another
provision that provides security to the foreign investor by pro-
tecting the joint venture against expropriation by administra-
tive order.' A more palatable interpretation is that this
provision applies to ultra vires actions and that a carefully
drafted "objectives" clause in the venture's charter should
assuage the American investors' concerns.9 '
Though the Soviets probably would not invoke this provi-
sion, the American partner should specify in the Foundation
Documents the grounds for termination by either side.92 This
action would allow the American partner to minimize losses if
84. Sherr, supra note 14, at 27. Some possible reasons for termination might
include "the failure of Soviet agencies to supply promised credits, supplies, or
insurance, [or] undue interference by state agencies." Id.
85. Id. at 28.
86. Joint Venture Decree, supra note 3, at 758.
87. Dean, supra note 5, at 55.
88. Joint Venture Decree, supra note 3, at 751.
89. Gorbachev's Program, supra note 8, at 40.
90. Joint Venture Decree, supra note 3, at 752.
91. Letter, supra note 80.
92. A partial list of grounds for termination include a material breach of contract,
bankruptcy or insolvency of either partner, and expropriation by the Soviet
government. LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 40.
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the venture works out poorly and could protect its investment
against arbitrary action by the Soviets.
E. Funds and Credits
Joint ventures are required to allocate resources to several
funds that they must establish. The Joint Venture Decree
states that the Soviets must have at least fifty-one percent
ownership of the joint venture's "charter fund."93 This provi-
sion has been drastically amended to allow the "partners'
shares of the incorporation capital [charter fund] . . . [to be]
determined by agreement between them."94 The charter fund
is similar to a capital account, and the partners' contributions
to it are directly proportionate to their percentage of owner-
ship.95 The partners' contributions to the charter fund may
take many forms, and profits from the venture and additional
contributions can supplement the charter fund.'
The Joint Venture Decree also requires the venture to
contribute to "[a] reserve fund and other funds needed for the
activities thereof and for the social development of the collec-
tive."9 " The venture's contribution to these funds, unlike the
partners' contributions to the charter fund, is not specified in
the Joint Venture Decree. Instead, the parties must specify
such contributions in the Foundation Documents.98
Under the Joint Venture Decree, joint ventures may
obtain credits, when necessary, from Soviet or foreign banks.
93. Joint Venture Decree, supra note 3, at 751. The fund is also translated as an"authorized fund." LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 20.
The initial requirement that the Soviets must have at least fifty-one percent
ownership of the joint venture raised problems for some corporations. Many U.S.
companies forbid investments in which they have minority ownership. Conference
Board, supra note 17, at 3.
The Soviet's main purpose in requiring majority ownership was to control certain
segments of the venture's operation. As long as the segments the Soviets want to
control do not conflict with the segments the American partners want to control, the
parties should be able to resolve the issue of control by specifying the duties of the
officers and the manner of voting by the board.
94. Resolution, supra note 57, at 67. In practice, Soviet authorities probably would
not approve a joint venture in which the Soviets had a minimal ownership interest,
such as 20% or less. On the other hand, very few Americans would want 80%
ownership because this would require investing large sums of capital in the uncertain
Soviet economy.
95. See generally Sherr, supra note 14, at 36.
96. Joint Venture Decree, supra note 3, at 751-52.
97. Joint Venture Decree, supra note 3, at 755. These funds are also called
reserve, operating, and social funds. Viehe, supra note 50, at 193.
98. Joint Venture Decree, supra note 3, at 755.
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Foreign currency credits may be obtained from either the
Soviet Foreign Trade Bank or from foreign banks, with the
consent of the Soviet Foreign Trade Bank. Rubles may be
obtained from the State Bank of the USSR or the Soviet For-
eign Trade Bank.99 These banks have the power to ensure ade-
quate security for the credits and their timely repayment. 00
F. Contributions and Valuation
The Joint Venture Decree does not provide a minimum
capital contribution for the venture's charter fund.' 01 Each
partner may contribute cash, assets, or a combination of
each. 10 2 Soviet contributions will usually consist of buildings,
equipment, and natural resources. American contributions will
usually include cash, technology, and know-how.10 3 The pro-
portion of each partner's contribution determines the propor-
tion of ownership and the distribution of profits.0 4
The Joint Venture Decree stipulates that all contributions
will be valued in rubles at the "official exchange rate of the
State Bank of the USSR."' ' If no world market price exists,
the parties are to negotiate the value of the contributions. 0 6
The Supplemental Decree modifies this requirement by also
allowing the partners to value "their contributions in both
Soviet and foreign currency."'0 7 However, this modification
has not eliminated serious valuation problems.
The parties must determine the value of contributions,
considering the world market prices. This method has been
problematic. First, problems tend to arise when determining
the value of Soviet non-cash contributions. As one commenta-
tor noted, "[r]eal estate prices, the value of Soviet equipment,
or the value of Soviet processes or know-how may on occasion
be difficult to value by reference to world market prices."' '
This is true because Soviet prices do not reflect a market price,
99. Id. at 754.
100. Id. Moreover, foreign currency accounts in Soviet banks will earn interest at
world market rates, while the interest rates for ruble accounts will be determined by
the State Bank of the USSR. Id.
101. Id. at 751.
102. Id. at 752.
103. LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 15; Sherr, supra note 14, at 25.
104. Joint Venture Decree, supra note 3, at 755.
105. Id. at 752.
106. Joint Venture Decree, supra note 3, at 752.
107. LAw AND PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 70.
108. Sherr, supra note 14, at 25.
1989]
180 University of Puget Sound Law Review
but represent what the Soviet government has decided the
item should cost. This is also true because the ruble is over-
valued by the Soviets.1 °9 Although the Soviets have promul-
gated assessment guidelines to assist in determining the value
of Soviet contributions, 1 ° these guidelines are not useful in all
cases. For example, when valuing Soviet contributions that are
unique or have no precedent for comparison, these guidelines
are of little help."'
The American partners have four ways to value Soviet
non-cash contributions when conventional guidelines are not
useful. First, each party may separately negotiate the value of
the Soviets' contributions, then negotiate an agreed price. Sec-
ond, the parties may agree on an exchange rate for the ruble
instead of using the official Soviet exchange rate. Third, the
parties may agree to overvalue the American contribution to
compensate for the overvaluation of the Soviet contribution." 2
A final way American firms may mitigate this valuation prob-
lem is by minimizing their capital contributions. For example,
the capital contributions of Combustion Engineering to its $6
billion oil refinery joint venture were less than $200 million.1 3
A second valuation problem arises when trying to agree on
prices for American non-cash contributions "which reflect fair
market value.""' 4 The problem is caused by Soviet hesitation
in accepting the value the Americans place on their goods.
This problem can be solved in several ways. First, the parties
can negotiate the value of American non-cash contributions.
Second, the parties may agree to determine the value of such
contributions based on "the purchasing power of labor
units.""' 5 The third and probably best approach is for the
Americans to present their Soviet partners with documenta-
tion indicating the value of their contributions. This value may
be based on production costs or on market prices." 6
A final valuation problem, which affects the first two, is
that the official Soviet ruble exchange rate significantly over-
109. LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 16.
110. These guidelines are reprinted in LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 3, at
Appendix V.
111. Sherr, supra note 14, at 25.
112. LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 17.
113. Laurita and McGloin, supra note 71, at 46-47.
114. Viehe, supra note 50, at 185.
115. Id.
116. LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 16.
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estimates the ruble's true worth.117 This causes the value of
American cash and non-cash contributions to be significantly
discounted in favor of the Soviets. To solve this problem, the
Soviets recently announced a massive overhaul of their cur-
rency system. The first step is the devaluation of the ruble by
fifty percent as of January 1, 1990.118 Then, a new exchange
rate will be implemented on January 1, 1991.119 If successfully
implemented, the new currency system will solve many of the
valuation problems the ruble causes American partners. In the
meantime, the problem of the overvalued ruble can be resolved
by the parties negotiating an exchange rate120 or by valuing
American contributions at an exchange rate higher than the
official Soviet rate.
G. Joint Ventures and the Soviet Economy
The joint venture's relationship to the Soviet economy and
the Soviet government is vital to the success of the venture
and has changed several times since perestroika began. The
Joint Venture Decree allows the venture to directly contact
local government authorities. It also requires the venture to
establish relations with the proper central authorities of the
Soviet government and the local governments of the Union
Republics "superior to the soviet participant."'' This require-
ment presumably means the Soviet partner must establish
relations with the "ministry to which the Soviet partner is
responsible.'1 2
The venture's relationship to the Soviet economy is bro-
ken into two parts. The first part is the relationship the ven-
ture has with Soviet central planning, which determines
whether the venture will be supplied with the goods it needs.
The second part is its relationship with the Soviet economy,
which determines the process for buying its supplies and sell-
ing its products.
Because the Soviet joint venture is considered independent
117. Sherr, supra note 14, at 25. Some have argued that the Soviet ruble exchange
rate is four times its true value. Viehe, supra note 50, at 185.
118. Resolution, supra note 57, at 64.
119. The Resolution also directs Soviet authorities to complete, by the end of 1989,
a study of specific proposals of the new exchange system. Id.
120. Sherr, supra note 14, at 26. In fact, one Soviet official stated that potential
inequities resulting from the exchange rate problem could be solved by negotiation.
Id.
121. Joint Venture Decree, supra note 3, at 753-54.
122. Viehe, supra note 50, at 189.
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of Soviet central economic planning, the joint venture may
independently export and import products that are necessary
to its operations.1 23 That is, the venture is allowed to trade
directly with foreigners for these products using convertible
currency.24 The venture is also free to determine its own eco-
nomic operations and plans. 25  This means that "Soviet
authorities cannot dictate to the venture which suppliers it
should deal with, how much it should buy and sell, and so
on.' ' 1 26 However, this exclusion from the Soviet 5-year plan
raises a potential problem. A joint venture may need to
purchase certain materials in the Soviet Union, but may not be
able to do so because its operations are outside of the 5-year
plan. Moreover, the Joint Venture Decree does not guarantee
the venture access to these resources. 1 27
The Soviets have taken steps to calm American fears of
being unable to buy supplies in the Soviet Union for the joint
venture. Soviet authorities have privately said that joint ven-
ture demands for resources will take priority over the demands
of other Soviet businesses. 2 In addition to these Soviet guar-
antees, American businessmen should negotiate with the Sovi-
ets for assurances concerning venture supplies. These
guarantees should be in the Foundation Documents and should
take into consideration quality control, delivery dates, and pay-
ment schedules. 29 If the supplies are vital to the venture's
operations, the American partner should also consider stipulat-
ing in the Foundation Documents that the Soviet failure to
provide these supplies would be grounds for termination.
Unfortunately, even these steps may not guarantee the availa-
bility of supplies because the supply system in the Soviet
Union is generally inefficient and perestroika has done little to
improve it.
The Soviets have also frequently changed the process by
which the venture will buy supplies and sell products within
the Soviet Union. 3 ° The Joint Venture Decree requires that
all joint venture purchases of equipment, raw materials, and
123. Joint Venture Decree, supra note 3, at 754.
124. LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 23.
125. Joint Enterprises, supra note 3, at 754.
126. Sherr, supra note 14, at 32.
127. Carpenter and Smith, supra note 50, at 86.
128. Sherr, supra note 14, at 32.
129. LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 23.
130. These changes are described in LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 22-23.
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other products on the Soviet market and all sales of its prod-
ucts on the Soviet market be conducted in rubles through a
Soviet foreign trade organization (FTO), "taking into account
world market prices."' 1 Though the Soviets may have wanted
to take advantage of the FTOs' experience in dealing with for-
eigners by using them as intermediaries, subsequent laws have
changed the role of the FTO.'32 Joint ventures "may now buy
and sell on the soviet market either directly or through FTOs,
using either rubles or foreign currency."' 3 Consequently, the
venture's inability to sell directly on the Soviet market, which
had been called "the single most dissuasive element in the
joint-venture package,"'3 4 has been reduced. Whether joint
ventures will be successful in buying and selling in the Soviet
Union will depend on the success of perestroika.
In sum, the joint venture's relationship to the Soviet econ-
omy should be understood in light of perestroika reforms that
are designed to improve the Soviet economy's central planning
system. 3 5 The implementation of these reforms has caused
short-term havoc in the Soviet economy. For example, many
American business contacts in Soviet ministries have ended as
the Soviet foreign trade apparatus has been reformed.3 6 With-
out the successful implementation of these reforms, joint ven-
tures probably will not be successful over the long-term. After
all, "[a]n autonomous capitalist joint venture is an anomaly in
a state-directed economy.' 311 7
H. Hard Currency Issues
A major concern for American businessmen interested in
a joint venture in the Soviet Union is how to repatriate their
Soviet market earnings in hard currency. Indeed, repatriation
of earnings is considered the most troubling problem for joint
ventures in the Soviet Union.' The Soviets have guaranteed
joint ventures the right to repatriate profits, which are distrib-
131. Joint Enterprises, supra note 3, at 754.
132. See generally Gardner, Restructuring the Soviet Foreign Trade Sector, 23
COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 7 (1988).
133. LAW AND. PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 23.
134. Viehe, supra note 50, at 202.
135. See generally M. GORBACHEV, supra note 12, at 112; Gorbachev and Economic
Reform, supra note 24, at 56.
136. Dean, supra note 5, at 58.
137. Carpenter and Smith, supra note 50, at 84.
138. Dean, supra note 5, at 57.
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uted to each partner in relation to their proportionate share139
in foreign exchange.14' Due to another Joint Venture Decree
provision, however, this "guarantee" has not ended American
concerns about being unable to repatriate profits in hard cur-
rency from the Soviet Union. This provision, which limits
repatriation of profits, has been a stumbling block for many
joint ventures. The provision provides that "[a]ll currency
expenditures of a joint enterprise [venture], including the pay-
ment of profit and other amounts due foreign participants and
specialists, must be ensured by the joint enterprise from
receipts from the realization of its products on the foreign
market."'141
This provision has two main effects. First, it requires the
joint venture to earn enough hard currency to cover its hard
currency expenses or, in the alternative, it must be able to con-
vert rubles into hard currency. The practical effect is to force
the venture to be export oriented since the venture probably
would not earn hard currency by selling in the Soviet Union.142
Perhaps the Soviets sought this effect because two Soviet goals
for joint ventures are that they be export oriented and earn
hard currency. The second effect of this provision is to force
joint ventures that import a large amount of their products to
have plenty of hard currency because payment for such
imports "must also be covered by proceeds from the sales of
the joint-venture's products on foreign markets.' 43
However, these effects conflict with the goals of many
businesses that seek to set up ventures in the Soviet Union.
The primary motivation for American companies to invest in
joint ventures in the Soviet Union is the large, untapped
domestic Soviet market.14 Most Americans investing in joint
ventures in the Soviet Union want to sell their products in the
Soviet market. One commentator noted that
[t]here is enormous pent up demand in the USSR, both in
the production and retail sectors .... Retail customers have
saved their rubles for years, waiting in vain for goods and
139. Joint Venture Decree, supra note 3, at 755.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 754.
142. Viehe, supra note 50, at 190; Carpenter and Smith, supra note 50, at 83-84.
143. Viehe, supra note 50, at 190. Of course, ventures that are not export-oriented
may earn hard currency by import-substitution or by catering to foreign tourists
through methods such as establishing hotels.
144. Sherr, supra note 14, at 8.
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services on which it is worth spending their money. Many
Soviet consumers consider Western styles and technology to
be highly attractive.' 45
The Americans investing in these joint ventures do not
want them to be export oriented for two reasons. First, many
companies already sell extensively in foreign markets. These
companies will not want to set up ventures in the Soviet Union
that will compete with their already existing operations.'4 6 Sec-
ond, as with any new operation, there are risks that it will not
be profitable or will be plagued with problems. Given the
uncertain success of Soviet economic reforms and the
mercurial nature of U.S.-Soviet economic relations, these risks
will be increased.
Although the Joint Venture Decree creates problems for
partners trying to repatriate hard currency, these problems can
be avoided or minimized in five ways. The first and best way
to avoid hard currency problems is to invest in joint ventures
that would be able to earn enough hard currency for repatria-
tion. The Soviets are helping in this regard by indicating that
they will approve only joint ventures that have a good chance
of earning enough hard currency for their operations. Addi-
tionally, the Soviets may approve certain high priority ven-
tures regardless of their hard currency earnings potential,
which could force the Soviets to commit their own hard cur-
rency reserves to the venture."'
Second, in response to foreign concerns, the Soviets
promulgated foreign exchange clearing procedures.' 4 ' These
procedures may permit a venture that is "short of hard cur-
rency to offset its shortage against surplus hard currency
which may be available from other enterprises within the same
ministry.' '1 49
A third way for a joint venture to minimize or avoid repa-
triation problems is for the joint venture to develop a strong
export market. A strong export market should assure the
joint venture that it will earn enough foreign exchange so as to
meet its repatriation requirements. The success of this option
145. Id.
146. Carpenter and Smith, supra note 50, at 84. This was a major reason that
Monsanto's negotiations with the Soviets failed. Dreyfus, Negotiating the Kremlin
Maze, Bus. MONTH, Nov. 1988.
147. Dean, supra note 5, at 57.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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may depend upon the type of product or service exported,
labor costs, and the propinquity of the operation to its export
market.'5 °
Fourth, the venture may try to set up countertrade
arrangements.' 5 ' Combustion Engineering Corporation, the
first U.S.-Soviet joint venture, is using one such method: '.buy-
back." Under the buy-back agreement, Combustion Engineer-
ing will make instruments for oil refineries. Instead of being
paid in rubles or dollars, Combustion Engineering will be paid
in refined products, which it then can sell for hard currency. 52
Likewise, Pizza Hut plans to take out Russian-grown mush-
rooms as part of its profits. 53 Countertrade arrangements will
work only if the Soviet goods are exportable.
A fifth method to ensure repatriation of hard currency
earnings is the consortium arrangement. In March 1989, East-
man Kodak, RJR Nabisco, Johnson & Johnson, Archer Dan-
iels Midland, Mercator Corporation, and Chevron formed the
American Trade Consortium (ATC). A Soviet counterpart was
set up that consisted of the major Soviet economic ministries.
Although the details of the arrangement are not fully known,
the agreement may lead to the establishment of 25 joint ven-
tures over the next 20 years. These ventures would primarily
be in consumer and industrial goods. There is also speculation
that ATC members would pool their hard currency earnings,
which would allow an ATC member that does not earn enough
foreign exchange to obtain hard currency from other ATC
members.154
Other approaches to dealing with the problem of repatria-
150. LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 33.
151. Countertrade is the process by which the seller provides the buyer with
products or services and agrees to buy other goods from the buyer.
152. Washington Post, Nov. 12, 1987, at El, col. 4. However, two major problems
exist with this type of arrangement. First, it is difficult to find Soviet-made products
for which there is a demand outside the Soviet bloc. There are many reasons for this,
including poor quality of the products. Second, the producers of the few Soviet
products that are exported for hard currency probably would prefer to earn hard
currency rather than rubles from such sales. Countertrade may still be a viable option
if inexperienced Soviet producers can rely on the American partner's expertise in
international business. LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 35.
153. Dreyfus, supra note 146.
154. N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1989, at D4, col. 2. Another consortium was organized in
mid-May. Five U.S. health care companies, including HCA International Pfizer,
Abbott Laboratories, Medserv International, and Hewlett-Packard are in the
consortium with Soviet health care organizations. Galuszka and Brady, The Chill is
Gone, and US. Companies are Moscow-Bound, Bus. WEEK, June 5, 1989, at 64.
[Vol. 13:165
Joint Ventures in the Soviet Union
tion of profits, such as import substitution 155 and agreements
whereby American partners keep a disproportionate share ofhard currency profits,'56 are less likely to be successful becausethey cut into the Soviet share of hard currency earnings. Nev-
ertheless, the Soviets might disregard such a result and help asmall company start its operations in the Soviet Union for
export if the products are a high priority to the Soviets."5 7
The Soviets realize that repatriation of hard currency prof-its is essential to attracting more American joint ventures.
Accordingly, the Soviets have been flexible in allowing jointventure partners to find creative ways to do so. The partners
may create new approaches to solve the problems of hard cur-rency repatriation as long as their actions do not violate Sovietlaw. 5 ' The Soviets must continue to be flexible on this issue
or risk ruining the positive joint venture climate they have
attempted to create.
I. Taxation and Accounting
As with hard currency issues, the Soviets have been quiteflexible in working out potential taxation and accounting
problems. The Joint Venture Decree requires the venture tokeep its business, bookkeeping, and statistical records in thesame manner as a Soviet State enterprise."5 9 This creates aproblem because Soviet accounting principles and objectives
are quite different from American accounting principles andobjectives.16 0 Soviet accounting principles are intended to pro-vide Soviet central planners with the statistical information
that they require for state planning. American and Western
accounting principles are designed to provide financial infor-
mation and determine profits.16'
The Decree also requires the partners to provide a proce-
155. LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 34.
156. Id. at 35.
157. Sherr, supra note 14, at 12.
158. Joint Venture Decree, supra note 3, at 751. Gorbachev has also stated this
position. M. GORBACHEV, supra note 12, at 108.
159. Joint Venture Decree, supra note 3, at 757.
160. A good example of these differences is in the different depreciation rates.Depreciation rates in the Soviet Union are usually longer than in Western countries,
which creates tax disadvantages. Soviet depreciation rates are longer because the
Soviets usually replace older factories that wear out rather than upgrade them with
new equipment. LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 28.
161. See generally Maggs, Joint Enterprises in Relation to Soviet Banking and
Financial Law, 23 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 13, 16 (1988).
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dure whereby information affecting the joint venture's opera-
tions would be furnished to the partners. To meet this
requirement, the partners may set up internal auditing proce-
dures.162 The Joint Venture Decree does not prohibit particu-
lar internal auditing procedures nor does it prescribe particular
procedures. Consequently, the partners should be able to set
up internal security procedures of their choice to protect the
accuracy of the joint venture's books. These procedures should
be specified in the Foundation Documents to increase the
probability that they will be followed. 163
Partners have chosen two ways to solve accounting related
problems. First, the Soviets have been willing to allow the
joint venture to maintain two sets of books and records. One
set would be in accordance with established Soviet accounting
principles, the other in accordance with the partner's preferred
accounting principles. 164 The second approach, suggested by
the Soviets, is for the partners to negotiate mutually acceptable
accounting procedures. The joint venture partners would then
seek separate official approval from the USSR Ministry of
Finance and USSR Central Bureau of Statistics, which issues
Soviet accounting principles, for the adoption and use of these
principles.165
A concern related to accounting is the method of taxing
the joint venture.166 The basic problem is that the Joint Ven-
ture Decree provides a tax rate of thirty percent of profits but"provides no definitive statement of how the concept of profit
is to be arrived at nor any accounting guidelines to determine
profit.' 67 The purpose here is not to examine how different
accounting principles would yield different profits. 6 ' Instead,
the purpose is to provide the reader with a basic understanding
of taxation on venture profits.
The Soviets have granted some tax breaks to joint ven-
162. Id. External auditing procedures are also governed by the Decree. Id.
163. LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 29.
164. Dean, supra note 5, at 57.
165. Id.
166. This Comment discusses the taxation of the joint venture and does not
discuss taxation of personal income of employees. The latter subject is dealt with in
Maggs, supra note 161, at 21.
The procedures for paying taxes and the penalties for late payments are
straightforward and have been adequately discussed elsewhere. See Viehe, supra note
50, at 195-96.
167. Viehe, supra note 50, at 194.
168. See generally LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 30-31.
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tures. The Joint Venture Decree provides joint ventures with a
tax holiday on their profits during the first two years of opera-
tion.16 9 Unfortunately, most joint ventures would not have
profits to exempt under this provision, which made the exemp-
tion a nullity. 7 ° Thus, the Supplemental Decree was promul-
gated granting joint ventures a two year tax holiday starting
from the first year the venture makes a profit.' The tax holi-
day is extended to three years for ventures "in the far Eastern
Economic Region."' 72 The Ministry of Finance also has the
right to reduce a venture's tax rate or eliminate its tax 173 and
has extended the tax holiday to certain high priority ven-
tures.' 74  Nonetheless, some have argued that the Soviets
should have been more generous to the ventures by extending
the tax holiday from four to ten years, as is the Western
practice.'7 5
The tax rate on venture profits is thirty percent. The joint
venture may repatriate its share of the profits only after pay-
ing an additional twenty percent withholding tax, 76 making
the effective tax rate for repatriated profits forty-four percent.
Unfortunately, American businesses may be at a competitive
disadvantage because "the U.S.-Soviet tax treaty does not con-
tain a provision reducing Soviet withholding taxes on dividends
paid on a Soviet business to a U.S. investor.' 77 However, the
Soviets have tax treaties with many other countries that elimi-
nate the twenty percent withholding tax. 7 ' Thus, a U.S. part-
ner might circumvent the tax disadvantage by investing in a
joint venture through a third country that has a tax agreement
with the Soviets that eliminates the twenty percent withhold-
ing tax. 79
169. Joint Venture Decree, supra note 3, at 755-56.
170. Maggs, supra note 161, at 19-20.
171. LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 3, at app. X.
172. Resolution, supra note 57, at 67. The Resolution also states that the tax on
joint venture profits in the region will be reduced to ten percent. Id.
173. Joint Venture Decree, supra note 3, at 755-56.
174. Dean, supra note 3, at 757. Only six of thirty joint ventures have been given
this special treatment. Sherr, supra note 14, at 35.
175. Viehe, supra note 50, at 195.
176. Joint Enterprises, supra note 3, at 756.
177. LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 48. The U.S.-USSR tax treaty is
explained in detail in M. NEWCITY, TAXATION IN THE SOVIET UNION, ch. 6 (1986).
178. The Soviet Union's other tax agreements are dealt with extensively in M.
NEWCITY, supra note 177, at ch. 7.
179. LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 49. There are several methods to
circumvent the tax disadvantage created by the U.S.-Soviet treaty. Id. at 48-50.
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In determining its taxable profits, the Joint Venture
Decree allows the venture two types of deductions. First, the
venture may deduct from income any transfers to the reserve
funds or other funds "for the development of production, sci-
ence, and technology.' 0 Deductions are allowed as long as
the reserve fund does not fall below twenty-five percent of the
charter fund.'8 '
The second type of deduction is for other business
expenses, which will be determined by the accounting system
the venture uses. Soviet accounting principles will usually
yield larger taxable profits than American or Western princi-
ples because the Soviet principles "do not account for many
items reflected as expenses under Western principles."'1 2
Thus, the accounting system employed will have a noticeable
effect on the amount of business expense deductions.
IV. SYSTEMIC PROBLEMS
The success of joint ventures in the Soviet Union will
depend on more than just the laws. Indeed, even if the Soviet
joint venture laws met every need of American business, the
success of joint ventures in the Soviet Union could not be guar-
anteed. The reason is that perestroika has not solved the
problems inherent in the Soviet system. Because many
problems with the Soviet economic system 8 3 have existed for
nearly fifty years or more, their removal is difficult at best.'4
Furthermore, economic reforms have been tried before in the
Soviet Union without much success.'8 5
The major systemic problem confronting the success of
joint ventures in the Soviet Union is the bureaucracy. The
bureaucracy affects the successful implementation of per-
estroika and affects the ability of joint ventures to do busi-
ness.'8 6 Soviet bureaucrats depend upon the current economic
180. Joint Venture Decree, supra note 3, at 755-56.
181. Id. at 755.
182. LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 30.
183. Problems inherent in the Soviet system*, such as central planning, and others
created by the system will be examined as systemic problems.
184. The problems of the Soviet system and how they affect perestroika have been
widely discussed. See generally GORBACHEV'S CHALLENGE, supra note 11, at 1-85;
Gorbachev and Economic Reform, supra note 24, at 56.
185. GORBACHEV'S CHALLENGE, supra note 11, at 42-85.
186. William Zolner, who was part of Combustion Engineering's negotiating team,
argued that bureaucracy causes everything to take "four times as long over there [in
the Soviet Union]." Dreyfus, supra note 146, at 60.
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system of central planning for their jobs. To fundamentally
change the central planning system, which is a major goal of
Gorbachev, would mean the end of many jobs. On the other
hand, if the Soviets do not fundamentally change their central
planning system, they risk falling further behind the West in
the high technology revolution."8 7 Basically, Gorbachev's chal-
lenge is to win the support of the same people whose jobs are
threatened by the success of perestroika and who defend the
current central planning system. 88 Many people have argued
that the resistance of these entrenched bureaucrats will thwart
the success of Gorbachev's reforms.8 9
An excellent example of how bureaucratic resistance to a
reform can hinder its implementation is the Enterprise Law. 9 °
Passed on June 30, 1987, this law was designed to make enter-
prises eventually self-sufficient. Enterprises would become
less dependent on Soviet ministries for their contracts and
more dependent on direct contacts with customers. Because
the ministries became concerned that they might lose control
of enterprises if the law succeeded, they successfully opposed
implementation of this law. "It has now been publicly
acknowledged that the ministries have effectively sabotaged
what was originally considered to be the key regulation of
Gorbachev's reform process."' 91 The failure of such an impor-
tant reform reveals how strong the bureaucratic resistence can
be to reforms that may threaten job security or authority. One
must wonder how successful Gorbachev will be with his other
reforms if his attempt to implement the cornerstone of per-
estroika has been temporarily thwarted.'92
Likewise, the implementation of gospriyemka, a quality
control program, has had mixed results. 9 ' In fact, the quality
controls were relaxed "[b]ecause many enterprises were unable
187. Gorbachev and Economic Reform, supra note 24, at 71.
188. Id. at 61.
189. Horvath, Soviet Economic Reforms are Destined to Fizzle, CHALLENGE, Mar.-
Apr. 1988, at 50.
190. This example is taken from Perestroika in the Soviet Union, supra note 8, at
315.
191. Id. Goldman argues that a similar fate has befallen the Law on Cooperatives.
Id.
192. One commentator has argued that many Soviet managers have a wait-and-see
attitude during the early stages of perestroika because they "are skeptical about the
changes of Gorbachev's reforms." Sherr, supra note 14, at 17.
193. Gorbachev's Program, supra note 8, at 7-18.
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to deal with the tough quality standards[.]' '194 The successful
implementation of gospriyemka is vital to the success of joint
ventures because American businessmen are concerned that
the low quality standards that plague Soviet products will
plague products made by joint ventures. 195 If these quality
control concerns are not satisfactorily addressed, joint venture
products will be uncompetitive with Western products. This
will undermine a chief Soviet goal: increasing exports. Such
poor results would discourage further joint venture invest-
ments in the Soviet Union.
Bureaucratic resistance to perestroika can be overcome,
but Gorbachev must convince the Soviet bureaucrats that they
will benefit by perestroika. To succeed, Gorbachev must con-
vince them that whatever short-term inconveniences they
might experience will be outweighed by long-term improve-
ments in the quality of Soviet life." Unfortunately for
Gorbachev, many Soviets remember sacrifices for other eco-
nomic reforms that resulted in no improvement in their daily
lives.197
The second major systemic obstacle to successful joint ven-
tures is the Soviet labor force. The success of joint ventures
will depend in part on the quality of the Soviet work force. An
unproductive or inefficient work force is an obstacle for joint
venture investment because, among other things, it increases
production costs. Compared with American standards, the
Soviet labor force lacks creativity, is poorly disciplined, and is
poorly motivated.19 The joint venture will also have difficulty
in firing ineffective or lazy workers. Although one commenta-
tor admits that "[s]ome elements of the hiring and firing
processes may be open to negotiation by the joint venture part-
ners, [even if] others are likely to require clarification at high
political levels."' 9 9
Improving the work force will not be easy, as Gorbachev
has discovered.2 00 Helping Soviet workers become more crea-
tive or take initiative will take time because Soviet society sup-
194. Id. at 51.
195. Sherr, supra note 14, at 33.
196. Perestroika in the Soviet Union, supra note 8, at 341.
197. Id. at 313.
198. See generally GORBACHEV'S CHALLENGE, supra note 11; Gorbachev and
Economic Reform, supra note 24.
199. Sherr, supra note 14, at 38.
200. Gorbachev's Program, supra note 8, at 17.
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presses these traits.201  For example, central planning
discouraged innovation and creativity because ministers and
factory managers traditionally were "rewarded for producing
more, rather than improved, products. 20 2 Incentive pay to
help motivate workers and bonuses for others who excel are
also highly sensitive issues20 3 and could cause tensions between
the American partner and Soviet workers. Pay disparities
between Soviet and American managers might cause similar
problems because Soviet managers would feel slighted even
though they may lack the skill and training of the American
managers.
A third systemic problem is the under-developed Soviet
infrastructure. American businesses setting up joint ventures
in the Soviet Union should be prepared for certain inconve-
niences in conducting business. First, the Soviet Union has no
overnight mail service to the U.S.2 4 Second, the Soviet's tight
control of the flow of information within Soviet society (for
internal security reasons) might adversely affect joint venture
operations.0 5 Even when equipment such as copying and fax
machines is found, it usually is outdated and of poor quality.2 °6
Further, this control over the flow of information has resulted
in a Soviet phone system of extremely poor quality,20 7 which
could frustrate communications. Finally, the Soviet Union has
an inadequate supply of hotel, housing, and office space that
meets Western standards. When adequate space is available, it
is very expensive.08
American companies with international business experi-
ence will find the systemic problems in the Soviet Union simi-
lar to the systemic problems in devloping countries. As in
those countries, American partners must adapt to the country's
business culture and work within the existing framework.
201. GORBACHEV'S CHALLENGE, supra note 11, at 110-111.
202. Gorbachev and Economic Reform, supra note 24, at 60.
203. Berman and Wechsler, supra note 75.
204. Conference Board, supra note 17, at 8. Although there is no such service
within the Soviet Union, there is overnight mail service to the Soviet Union. Sherr,
supra note 14, at 42.
205. The strict control of access to copy machines, word processors, and computers
could be burdensome to the venture's operations, especially if the American personnel
are accustomed to such equipment and are denied its use.
206. GORBACHEV'S CHALLENGE, supra note 11, at 107-109; McLoughlin, Doder,
Santini, and Sandford, Gorbachev's Challenge, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 19,
1987, at 35.
207. GORBACHEV'S CHALLENGE, supra note 11, at 109-110.
208. Sherr, supra note 14, at 42.
1989]
194 University of Puget Sound Law Review
With patience, perseverance, and the success of perestroika,
American partners may find their hard work financially
rewarding.
V. POLITICAL PROBLEMS
The success of Gorbachev's reforms in general and joint
ventures in particular will also depend upon the political sta-
bility of the Soviet Union. Potential political problems that
could threaten perestroika are three-fold: internal opposition,
political unrest or instability, and U.S.-Soviet relations.
The first political problem is opposition to perestroika
within the Soviet government and, more importantly, within
the ruling Soviet Politburo. Gorbachev has tried to consolidate
his power base by replacing people who do not support per-
estroika with people who do. The most recent example of this
changing of the guard, and perhaps the most important in
terms of securing Gorbachev's position, was the September
1988 purge in the Politburo. °9 Gorbachev demoted three
Politburo members who were either against perestroika or
were against the pace at which it was moving. He also was
elected president and chief of state, in addition to his existing
position as general secretary of the Communist Party.
Gorbachev's moves have probably had three consequences.
First, they have reduced the influence of top-level opposition
to his reforms. Second, they have sent a warning to the
bureaucracy that he will not allow anything or anyone to hin-
der the implementation of perestroika. And third, they have
given Gorbachev the ability to circumvent the bureaucracy in
order to implement his reforms.2 1 ° While Gorbachev's consoli-
dation of power does not ensure the success of perestroika or
joint ventures, it does improve the likelihood that his reforms
will continue. However, his battles with internal opposition
will also continue.
The second political problem facing perestroika is the
political instability within the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe. Political unrest has been evident in many areas of the
209. Watson, Gorbechev's Power Play, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 10, 1988, at 48.
210. Id. at 52. The article states that "[t]he new system was designed by
Gorbachev as an end run on the party bureaucracy, which has stymied his reform
efforts in order to protect its own power and perks. Last week's purge was a warning
to the bureaucracy that Mikhail Gorbachev will not tolerate obstructionism." Id.
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Soviet empire, including Eastern Europe,2 ' Estonia, 2  and
Azerbaijan. s Such unrest could force the Soviets to crack
down on the demonstrators and suspend glasnost.2 4 Because
glasnost is necessary for the success of perestroika, a Soviet
crackdown could undermine perestroika2 5 and, consequently,
reduce American investor confidence in the Soviet Union.2 6
On the other hand, Gorbachev cannot allow such unrest to get
out of hand because of pressure from the Soviet military. The
manner in which Gorbachev handles these politically sensitive
regions and others will determine, in part, the success of joint
ventures.
Finally, the U.S.-Soviet relationship is important to the
success of joint ventures. Economic relations improve when
U.S.-Soviet political relations improve. When political rela-
tions fizzle, so do economic relations. Although Soviet political
relations with the U.S. should continue to improve over the
next few years, obstacles still remain. The Soviets view the
Jackson-Vanik Amendment,2 17 U.S. trade embargos,2 1  and
U.S. export restraints on strategic goods 219 as major obstacles
to improving economic relations with the U.S. Likewise,
Americans view poor access to the Soviet ministries220 and the
paucity of reliable information on the Soviet economy as major
obstacles to improved economic relations.22' Other Americans
argue that improved economic relations must not lead to the
transfer of technology and management know-how that could
assist the Soviet military.222
211. E.g., Seattle Times, Nov. 20, 1988, at All, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1988, at
A26, col. 1.
212. N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1988, at A26, col. 1.
213. Wall Street J., Mar. 1, 1988, at 25, col. 4.
214. See Soviet and Chinese Economic Reform, supra note 8.
215. Trewhitt, The Risks of a New Revolution, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Oct.
19, 1987, at 32; Wall Street J., Mar. 1, 1988, at 25, col. 4.
216. Sherr, supra note 14, at 22. O.P.I.C. does not provide political risk insurance
for businesses within the Soviet Union. However, private political risk insurance is
available. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1988, at D4, col. 2.
217. ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 19, at 7. The amendment prevents the U.S. from
granting most-favored status and government-backed credits to non-market economies
unless they allow free emigration of Jews.
218. Stevenson, Toward a More Rational East-West Trade Policy, 10 J. LEGIS. 11,
15 (1983).
219. H. Heiss, US.-Soviet Trade Trends, in Joint Economic Committee, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess., 2 U.S. Congress, Gorbachev's Economic Plans, 448, 470 (1987).
220. Trade Policy, supra note 9, at 1.
221. ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 19, at 5-6.
222. Pilon, A Yellow Light on US. Joint Ventures With the Soviets, No. 666 THE
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To attract potential American investors, Gorbachev must
convince them that the Soviet Union is a politically stable
country in which to invest. His failure to do so could have dire
consequences for the success of joint ventures in the Soviet
Union and for perestroika.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Comment has addressed the major problems Ameri-
can partners face in establishing joint ventures in the Soviet
Union. Many of these problems will remain at least through
the mid-1990s while perestroika and new Soviet joint venture
laws attempt to solve other problems.
The ultimate success of joint ventures in the Soviet Union
depends on the Soviets. If they remain flexible and continue
to address American concerns and fears, American investment
in joint ventures should increase. However, if Gorbachev is
unable to successfully implement perestroika or promulgate
new Soviet joint venture laws that address the concerns
examined in this Comment, joint ventures in the Soviet Union
will be short-lived.
Geoffrey D. Swindler
HERITAGE FOUNDATION BACKGROUNDER 1, 11 (1988); see generally Walinsky, Coherent
Defense Strategy: The Case for Economic Denial, FOREIGN AFF., Winter 1982/83, at
272.
[Vol. 13:165
